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FIELDING'S playful wisdom ensures that the narrative commentary in Tom Jones is thoughtfully entertaining. Its thoughtfulness is due, perhaps more than has been 
acknowledged, to its coherent treatment of empirical ideas. It 
has been suggested that Fielding realized that problems of 
knowledge are prior to the relation of understanding and judg-
ment and that this realization might have caused him to turn 
his comic attention to the ways in which knowledge is gained 
from experience. Indeed, John Preston claims that Tom Jones 
contains an epistemological impulse because the narrative 
stance prepares the reader to recognize that the novel is "about 
judgment, and the understanding necessary for good judgment" 
and because the plot "helps us to see how we acquire knowledge 
of human experience."1 This essay examines Fielding's serious 
and comic treatment of empirical ideas to advance appreciation 
of how he wanted the reader to apprehend and learn from the 
novel. 
To argue that empirical ideas are important to Fielding's 
narrative commentary is unusual to the extent that customar-
ily his ideas are derived from the Latitudinarian churchmen or 
from Shaftesbury.2 The consequence is that emphasis is most 
often placed upon benevolence and optimism in his thinking. 
The little attention that has been paid to Fielding's empirical 
ideas derives from a sense of his reaction to John Locke.3 Con-
siderable affinities can be noticed, however, between Fielding's 
and Locke's ideas. Indeed, some of the philosopher's less well-
known positions in his educational writings allow us to see how 
agreeable it must have been for the novelist to introduce empir-
ical ideas into his narrative commentary for serious and comic 
purposes. 
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To begin with, Locke and Fielding share ideas about the 
conditions necessary to learning. In Some Thoughts concerning 
Education,* Locke defends physical and scholarly discipline but 
opposes mindless corporal punishment and abstract studies. 
Convinced that pain coarsens children, Locke proposes that, 
when reproving misbehaviour, the adult should pretend to be 
amazed by ill-conduct so that the child will benefit from realiz-
ing he is assumed to be responsible (pp. 30,60-1, and 64). In Tom 
Jones Thwackum, whose name, as well as meditations, is "full 
of Birch," drives Tom to an understandable but unacceptable 
rebelliousness (III, v and viii).5 But, whereas Thwackum is 
comically deflated because of his coarse sense of pedagogy, 
Allworthy is almost an ideal teacher. He does not try to convince 
Jenny Jones about her immorality, but trusts to her sense of 
responsibility: "A Hint therefore, to awaken your Sense of this 
Matter, shall suffice; for I would inspire you with Repentance, 
and not drive you to Desperation" (I, vii). For Locke and Field-
ing the conditions under which learning takes place must be 
humane; both care more for affecting people than for abstract 
reason. Hence, Locke celebrates the power of example for 
reaching and touching children's reasoning (p. 61) and Fielding 
holds that a narrative incident is more enlightening than "the 
longest Dissertation" (III, iii). 
Both Locke and Fielding imply that the conditions necessary 
to learning should be based on religious assumptions. Hence 
they distinguish between education and learning. Locke scorns 
traditional education because he values conduct more than 
learning, and Fielding delights in revealing how vulnerable 
traditional education is to doctrinaire thinking. Locke's de-
mand that learning be matched to disposition and that the 
individual be trained to social affections insists that learning is 
as much a matter of temperament and habit as it is of step-by-
step understanding. For Locke, the individual's acquisition of 
proper social conduct becomes second nature: it requires no 
thought or reflection (p. 38). When, with witty and deliberate 
indirectness, Fielding refers to Tom's conscience, the novelist 
substitutes implications about the practical integrity of consci-
ence for nominal categories and rational absolutes: 
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Mr. Jones had Somewhat about him, which, though I think Writers 
are not thoroughly agreed in its Name, doth certainly inhabit some 
human Breasts; whose Use is not so properly to distinguish Right from 
Wrong, as to prompt and incite them to the former, and to restrain and 
with-hold them from the latter. (IV, vi). 
With deference to Fielding's commentator, the novelist is not so 
much discriminating between the guiding and the judging 
aspects of conscience.6 Rather he emphasizes that Tom's con-
science is an "active Principle" which "doth not content itself 
with Knowledge or Belief only" in order to show that virtue is 
not the object of reason or the effect of education. Both Locke 
and Fielding limit the scope of education and promote practical 
virtue on the basis of religious assumptions about human na-
ture. Locke relies upon innate predispositions to temper educa-
tional ambition: 
God has stamp'd certain Characters upon Men's Minds, which like 
their Shapes, may perhaps be a little mended, but can hardly be totally 
alter'd and transform'd into the contrary. 
(p. 40) 
Similarly, Fielding's contention that "Men of true Wisdom and 
Goodness are contented to take Persons and Things as they are" 
and that "there is, perhaps, no surer Mark of Folly, than an 
Attempt to correct the natural Infirmities of those we love" (II, 
vii) is chastening to educational aims. On account of the incur-
able flaws of human nature, Fielding proposes that men must 
learn to possess an "over-looking Disposition" in order to exer-
cise friendship. A religious sense of forgiveness together with 
an awareness of required social conduct is Fielding's goal for 
learning. 
The worst effect of traditional education in Locke's eyes is 
affectation, which he attributes to lazy teachers who prom-
ulgate rules with merely theoretical examples. True learning 
avoids affectation by enhancing god-given dispositions in a way 
that harmonises thinking and action: 
The Actions which naturally flow from such a well-form'd Mind, please 
us also, as the genuine Mark of it; and being as it were natural Emana-
tions from the Spirit and Disposition within, cannot but be easy and 
unconstrain'd. (p. 41) 
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Locke's definition of affectation as pretence to a good disposition 
and disguise of a bad one (p. 42) is close to Fielding's explanation 
of affectation in the preface of Joseph Andrews. Despite his 
distinction between the ostentation of vanity and the deceit of 
hypocrisy, Fielding is most concerned to show that the discre-
pancy between thinking and action deserves ridicule. One of the 
best examples of this concern in Tom Jones is Fielding's amus-
ingly generalized presentation of Square's failure to practice 
what he preaches: 
For though such great Beings think much better and more wisely, they 
always act exactly like other Men. They know very well how to subdue 
all Appetites and Passions, and to despise both Pain and Pleasure; and 
this Knowledge affords much delightful Contemplation, and is easily 
acquired; but the Practice would be vexatious and troublesome; and, 
therefore, the same Wisdom which teaches them to know this, teaches 
them to avoid carrying it into Execution. (V, v) 
Here Fielding deflates self-contained thinking by ironically 
granting achievements to mind that make no sense without 
commitment to practice and social conduct. 
Related to concern for the integration of thinking and action 
is Locke's and Fielding's appreciation of prudence. For both men 
prudence accommodates the secular and the religious. 
Although Locke's educational emphasis is secular in that he 
believes education should enable men to live without excessive 
suspicion or confidence and to develop mutual understanding 
through social concourse (p. 71), he insists that education ulti-
mately serves religious faith. "Enlargement of our Minds to-
wards a truer and fuller Comprehension of the intellectual 
World" (p. 167), since the "Works of Nature" cannot be reduced 
"into a Science" (p. 166), requires revelation as well as reason. 
The very deficiencies of natural philosophy and of the syste-
mization of spiritual knowledge mean for Locke that education 
must be tempered by prudence, and prudence is a matter of 
understanding religious principles through the practice of faith 
(p. 116). Indeed, for Locke prudence is second only to faith: 
a man may be, perhaps, a good man (who lives in truth and sincerity of 
heart towards God) with a small portion of prudence, but he will never 
be very happy in himself, nor useful to others, (p. 196) 
EMPIRICISM AND JUDGMENT IN "TOM JONES' 7 
Fielding expresses a similar belief in Tom Jones when, in a 
crucial — and playful — paragraph in which he moves from 
speculating about future readers to magisterially addressing 
"worthy Disciples," he argues that the individual cannot con-
centrate upon interior goodness: "Prudence and Circumspection 
are necessary even to the best of Men."7 In fact, "no Man can be 
good enough to enable him to neglect the Rules of Prudence" 
(III, vii). Tom must add to his good, generous, and honourable 
temper prudence and religion (V, vii). For Fielding, as for 
Locke, prudence is not just a consideration of circumstance: 
"Prudence is indeed the Duty which we owe to ourselves" in 
order to protect virtue and to earn a morally constructive rela-
tion with society (XVIII, x). Locke and Fielding both value 
prudence not only because it entails upon learning an accom-
modation of religious and secular ideas but also because it 
obliges learning to be connected to action and social commit-
ment. 
The way in which Fielding employs narrative commentary 
for the embodiment of ideas can be usefully related to Locke's 
notions about learning, reading, and the writer's rôle in Of the 
Conduct of the Understanding. In this work Locke details the 
idolatrous attention men pay to their own ideas (p. 32)8 and 
maintains that conversation is the only remedy of such pre-
judice (p. 35). Locke also considers the relation between fallibil-
ity and reading; he suggests that a training in moral and ab-
stract ideas offsets readers' tendencies to lose themselves in 
circumstances and to generalize too easily from particulars (p. 
65). Locke insists that the writer must consider it his duty to 
provoke connected thinking in the reader and to assume that 
reading provides the materials of thought rather than produces 
actual thinking (p. 73). For Locke, the writer who recognizes 
that he cannot transfuse knowledge into the reader must accept 
the priority of truth and make sure that literary devices convey 
this priority (p. 87). 
Fielding enjoys exposing characters who idolize their own 
ideas. For instance, the landlord who deceives himself into 
believing that Sophia is Jenny Cameron likes to be thought to 
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see "farther and deeper into Things than any Man in the Par-
ish." Not only is he deflated because of his low political prejudice 
and self-interest but also his ideas lack authority on account of 
his abuse of conversation. He pretends to be tentatively reason-
able but is actually merely ambivalent: he leaves his hearers to 
understand more than he expresses. His reputation for wisdom 
is valueless because "Men are strangely inclined to worship 
what they do not understand" (XI, ii). Both Squire and Mrs. 
Western are mocked for their pretension to authoritative and 
distinctive ideas. Fielding describes their mental perversities in 
a comically complementary manner. While the Squire never 
bothers to look ahead but concerns himself only with the pre-
sent, Mrs. Western, ignoring the actual, views everything from 
a distant perspective. Their pretensions to talent are excessive 
and self-defeating. "For as the Sister often foresaw what never 
came to pass, so the Brother often saw much more than was 
actually the Truth" (X, viii). The Westerns separate perception 
and reflection; the Squire overparticularizes and Mrs. Western 
overgeneralizes, but illusion is the common result. 
His awareness of the reader's distinct but thoughtless in-
clinations to be engrossed by narrative detail and to generalize 
narrative particulars leads Fielding to comment slyly on the 
writer's rôle as a way of inducing the audience to be self-
conscious and critically intelligent. Frequently, he stresses the 
factual nature of his story to show that reading provides mate-
rial for thought rather than thinking itself. When, for example, 
he says "it is our Province to relate Facts, and we shall leave 
Causes to Persons of much higher Genius" (II, iv), he warns of 
the irrelevance of the philosophy of causation while he makes 
his partial and dictatorial tone the object of the reader's 
humour. But, if, by emphasizing the factual, he wishes to illus-
trate the empirical basis of reading and thinking, Fielding 
refuses to limit himself to a factual content. Often he confesses 
that he is suppressing detail; that is, he recounts what is mini-
mally necessary: "it is not our Custom to unfold at any Time 
more than is necessary for the Occasion" (XV, vi). Of course, 
Fielding tantalizes because he does not always provide what is 
even minimally necessary. But he does turn this authorial 
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prerogative into a way of obliging the reader to think under 
circumscribed conditions. Fielding precisely limits the reader's 
scope for induction and deduction yet allows the reader an 
amused reaction to the author. Because the author variously 
and comically reveals and conceals, the reader painlessly sees 
the need to connect the particular and general, the fact and idea. 
Like Locke, Fielding is aware that he must confront superfi-
cial reading: he claims that people commonly "read Books with 
no other View than to say they have read them" (XVI, i). Hence, 
he involves readers by obliging them to deduce moral infer-
ences. He frequently provides opportunities for the exercise of 
controlled conjectures;9 but he announces these opportunities 
with an inductiveness that is suspiciously ironical. For in-
stance, he teasingly pretends that to speculate about unre-
corded events is more significant than to conjecture about un-
specified mental conduct in a context which renders it impera-
tive to judge characters in terms of general human nature (III, 
i). Obviously Fielding holds that "every Book ought to be read 
with the same Spirit, and in the same Manner, as it is writ" (IV, 
i), but he does not make his spirit obvious or dogmatic because 
he recognizes the impossibility of transfusing knowledge into 
his readers. His trust that his novel will mediate knowledge, 
however, explains why Fielding desires the reader to recognize 
the need to keep the story within the bounds of human agency 
and to avoid the imaginative surprises of mere fiction. Fielding 
will not be accused of "falling into Fiction" (VIII, i): probability 
and truthfulness to history are criteria that he applies to rheto-
ric and imagery as well as to plot. Hence, when he describes 
Mrs. Wilkin's visit to the parish with the simile of a kite, he 
merely pretends to be the proud, refined, and magisterial 
writer: 
The sagacious Reader will not, from this Simile, imagine these poor 
People had any Apprehension of the Design with which Mrs. Wilkins 
was now coming towards them; but as the great Beauty of the Simile 
may possibly sleep these hundred Years, till some future Commentator 
shall take this Work in hand, I think proper to lend the Reader a little 
Assistance in this Place. (I, vi) 
His intrusiveness, aestheticism, and uncertainty about poster-
ity's response ironically help to stress that Fielding is interested 
10 ROBERT J A M E S M E R R E T T 
in the general significance and illustrative force of the simile 
rather than in any capacity it might have as a token of psycho-
logical point of view. This is true of his skilful deployment of 
literary devices. 
The understanding of the nature of learning which he seems 
to share with Locke certainly informs Fielding's disposition of 
narrative stance. There is characteristically comic oscillation 
between affirmative and tentative expressions in this stance 
which obliges the reader to consider the limits of knowledge, 
how knowledge is gained from experience, and what part causal 
explanations play in the acquisition of knowledge. When, for 
instance, Fielding seemingly accounts for Northerton's escape 
from captivity, he employs a sentence structure consisting of a 
main clause and two subordinate but coordinate adverb clauses 
of condition. This structure appears to offer a simple, categoric-
al explanation of alternative causes: 
But whether Northerton was carried away in Thunder or Fire, or in 
whatever other Manner he was gone; it was now certain, that his Body 
was no longer in Custody. (VII, xiv) 
The reader may be obliged to accept the factual certainty of 
Northerton's disappearance, but he cannot accept it as a given 
because the two clauses of condition are not of equivalent sta-
tus: in the first, Fielding mockingly presents a superstitious 
explanation, and, in the second, he is irritatingly uncategorical. 
This second clause simply makes us want to know the land-
lady's relation with Northerton which Fielding has just before 
hinted at and ironically pretended to be irrelevant. The alterna-
tives are not even alternate. Fielding has disclaimed narrative 
omniscience in order to induce the reader to see facts as they are 
and as they require sensible explanation. Often his pretence to 
unfold subtle causal alternatives leads the reader to recognize 
the empirical reality of the event described and to ponder a 
precise judgment. For example, when the sentinel fires his gun 
at the ghost-like Tom, Fielding is unable to say "Whether Fear 
or Courage was the Occasion of his Firing, or whether he took 
Aim at the Object of his Terror" (VII, xiv). In a sense, Fielding 
flourishes his lack of omniscience. This alerts the reader to the 
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deduction that the adverb clauses of condition are not equiva-
lent and that "Courage" in the first is ruled out by "Terror" 
in the second. Aided by Fielding's ironical avoidance of judg-
ment and by Tom's understanding of the sentinel's supersti-
tious fear, the reader is able to deduce the sentinel's probable 
mental state. The comic tensions between assertiveness and 
tentativeness in the narrative stance forestall speculative 
generalizations and direct attention to proper understanding of 
evidence. 
Even when Fielding's speculation about causes is expressed 
in more precise and equivalent categories, a humourous and 
thoughtful response is the outcome. The following disclaimer 
adds to the bathos of Square's discovery in Molly's closet: 
Now, whether Molly in the Agonies of her Rage, pushed this Rug with 
her Feet; or, Jones might touch it; or whether the Pin or Nail gave way 
of its own Accord, I am not certain. (V, v) 
The amusing descent into particulars and away from the most 
likely because most human cause is gradual. The categories 
become more limited but, paradoxically, more vague. We do not 
know whether the rug is attached by a pin or nail. By dissolving 
speculative and empirical categories Fielding illustrates the 
human reality of his story and obliges the reader to reconstruct 
the fictional context which supports that reality. By means of 
the assertive and tentative aspects of his narrative stance, 
Fielding invites the reader to expatiate responsibly with phe-
nomenal and verbal possibilities: this is both amusing and 
serious. 
Fielding adopts the same narrative stance towards mind, for 
he seems intent on inducing the reader to realize the difficulty 
of knowing of the existence of ideas in the mind. For instance, he 
praises Sophia's modest good sense in her early relationship 
with Tom, but he will not describe her emotional responsiveness 
in a theoretical way: 
Though neither the young Man's Behaviour, nor indeed his 
Manner . . . were such as could give her any just Cause of suspecting he 
intended to make Love to her; yet whether Nature whispered some-
thing into her Ear, or from what Cause it arose I will not determine, 
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certain it is, some Idea ofthat Kind must have intruded itself; for her 
Colour forsook her Cheeks, her Limbs trembled, and her Tongue would 
have faultered, had Tom stopped for an Answer. (IV, v) 
The novelist refuses causal justification of Sophia's idea of love. 
But, after denying the applicability of a systematic explanation, 
he records the changes in her physical appearance as signs of 
her mental condition. Amusingly, he is hypothetical about her 
behaviour, while he is not about her ideas. He supposes the 
existence of a cause of Sophia's love, but will not be categorical 
about it. In this way he points to the difficulty of knowing mind 
rationally and to the necessity of knowing it empirically. His 
narrative stance shows that Fielding purposefully operates 
within restricted categories and that he is cheerfully cautious in 
describing the interior life. 
If, as in the previous example, Fielding's ambivalence about 
causation draws us closer to Sophia and leads us to recognize 
her interior and representative attractiveness, in other in-
stances it compounds the irony and satire. In the following mock 
speculation about Mrs. Blifil's reaction to her husband's death, 
the tentati veness of the grammar and the suggestiveness of the 
vocabulary expose both the histrionic behaviour of the widow 
and the hypocritical greed of her physicians: 
Whether, as the Lady had at first persuaded her Physicians to believe 
her ill, they had now, in return, persuaded her to believe herself so, I 
will not determine; but she continued a whole Month with all the 
Decorations of Sickness. (II, ix) 
Clearly, Mrs. Blifil's illness is sham, but there is also a tacit 
contract of self-interest between her and the doctors. A similar-
ly double ironic effect is produced when Fielding pretends to be 
unable to judge Dr. Blifil's faith: 
Whether his Religion was real, or consisted only in Appearance, I shall 
not presume to say, as I am not possessed of any Touchstone, which can 
distinguish the true from the false. (I, x) 
Not only does the context make Dr. Blifil's acquisitiveness and 
hypocrisy apparent but the peremptory and haughty tone of the 
disclaimer also signals the partial unreliability of the narrator. 
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The disclaimer may be valid theoretically since there can be no 
a priori way of measuring inner integrity. But, even as compla-
cent and abstract judgment is condemned implictly by the dis-
claimer, Dr. Blifil is satirized firmly and this satire implies 
Fielding's trust in a practical touchstone. While the ironical 
presentation of evidence and conclusion stems from Fielding's 
unsystematic attitude towards causation and from his belief in 
the need for personal realization of knowledge and judgment, 
his practical trust in knowledge of causation can be illuminated 
by the following passage in Of the Conduct of the Under-
standing: 
Every man carries about him a touchstone, if he will make use of it, to 
distinguish substantial gold from superficial glitterings, truth from 
appearances. And indeed the use and benefit of this touchstone, which 
is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed prejudices, over-
weening presumption and narrowing our minds. The want of exercising 
it in the full extent of things intelligible is that which weakens and 
extinguishes this noble faculty in us. (pp. 38-9) 
Locke here insists that the exercise of judgment is essential in 
the development of human potential, yet he stresses that it can 
operate properly only by being based on empirical assumptions 
about learning and knowledge. Fielding's ironical narrative 
stance exercises the reader's natural reason and induces him to 
think of judgment in terms of continuous effort, constant prac-
tice, and habit. 
That Fielding's allusions to Locke in Tom Jones are not re-
verential does not invalidate the contention that the novelist's 
ideas of learning and judgment are comparable to the philo-
sopher's. For Fielding is usually amusingly indirect about the 
sources of his ideas. In a passage which emphasizes the accessi-
bility of ancient ideas and indicates the bankruptcy of modern 
ones, Fielding with comic hyperbole insists that he will never 
"scruple to take to myself any Passage which I shall find in an 
antient Author to my Purpose, without setting down the Name 
of the Author from whence it is taken" (XII, ii). His sense of the 
commonwealth of ideas frequently leads him to mock the au-
thoritative citation of writers and ideas. For example: 
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It hath been observed by wise Men or Women, I forget which, that all 
Persons are doomed to be in Love once in their Lives. 11, xil It hath been 
observed by some Man of much greater Reputation for Wisdom than 
myself, that Misfortunes seldom come single. (Ill, ix) It was well-
remarked by one, (and perhaps by more) that Misfortunes do not come 
single. (VI, vii) 
In such formulaic sentences, Fielding exposes pedantry. The 
vagueness about authorities and the obviousness of the saws 
wittily illustrate that ideas are common property because they 
stem from the accumulated experience of mankind. On the 
other hand, Fielding wins precise comic effects from detailing 
the abuse of authorities. Hence, when Mrs. Western defies 
Sophia to argue with her, she asserts that "The antient Philo-
sophers, such as Socrates, Alcibiades, and others, did not use to 
argue with their Scholars" (VII, iii); her claim to follow Soc-
rates's educational ideas clashes ridiculously with her ignor-
ance of the philosopher's dialectical method. Citing authorities 
is an obvious way of rationalizing pride and laziness and of 
fortifying moral evasiveness. So, although Square models him-
self on Plato and Aristotle, he does so with no eclectic capacity. 
"In Morals he was a profest Platonist, and in Religion he in-
clined to be an Aristotelian" (III, iii). Square's merely academic 
sense of philosophy heightens his lack of integrity. Consequent-
ly, it is not surprising that Fielding does not regard modern 
philosophers with implicit respect. With tongue in cheek he 
praises Shaftesbury's elegance and greatness, but he is quietly 
derogatory when he refuses to justify Lady Bellaston's decep-
tion of Sophia in terms of the philosopher's sense of allowable 
prevarication (XIII, xii) and when he deflates Square's enthusi-
asm for Shaftesbury's stoic ideas by cheerfully describing the 
disruptive effect which the divine's biting his own tongue 
causes (V, ii). Fielding is also engagingly indirect in his critic-
ism of Locke. In arguing that invention and judgment are recip-
rocal as far as writers are concerned, Fielding rejects the well-
known, if unspecified, Lockean position that memory and judg-
ment operate separately (IX, i). Furthermore, that Mrs. Fitzpat-
rick has read Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
and uses Lockean explanations of cognitive weakness to excuse 
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her narrative incoherence implies Fielding's criticism that the 
authority of Locke is used to conceal moral duplicity (XI, vii). 
Nonetheless, Fielding's reliance upon Locke's empiricism is 
evident. For example, in a satirical attack on dramatic conven-
tions Fielding refers to Locke's blind man who ludicrously 
likened scarlet to the sound of a trumpet. Fielding's point is that 
the bombastic, archaic language of heroic plays would justify 
the blind man's likening it to the sound of a trumpet since it 
produces a mere idea of sensation (IV, i). He refers again to the 
blind man when he emphasizes that he must be able to assume 
that his readers have experienced love if he is to write about it. 
He claims that it would be as absurd for him to write without 
this assumption as it is for a blind man to talk about colours (VI, 
i). In the first allusion to the blind man Fielding maintains that 
simple ideas are important as touchstones and that ideas of 
sensation must be connected to ideas of reflection and in the 
second he suggests that ideas of sensation can serve as a para-
digm for ideas of reflection. 
Frequently, Fielding's comic descriptions of perception and 
comprehension exemplify serious empirical assumptions. 
Hence, he enjoys describing "the Operations of the Mind" (II, iv) 
when Mrs. Partridge's jealousy causes her to fluctuate wildly 
between certainty and doubt. Fielding limits himself to the 
evidence she possesses about her husband's infidelity and, with 
cheerful equivocation, maintains that she has enough to war-
rant suspicion about his deficiencies but not enough to doubt his 
sexual conduct. By contrast, Fielding justifies Sophia's suspi-
cion about Mrs. Fitzpatrick's morals. Sophia does not have a 
"Quicksightness into Evil." 1 0 Rather she is slow to be provoked 
and demonstrates "the Faculty of seeing what is before your 
Eyes, and of drawing Conclusions from what you see" (XI, x). 
Far from being suspicious or subjective, Sophia is a model of 
judgment because she balances diffidence and perspicacity in 
an empirically responsible way. Although he is ironical about 
Tom's diffident passion for Sophia, Fielding bases Tom's even-
tual suspicion of Sophia's love for him and his awareness of his 
feelings for her on an empirical sense of the way the mind 
works. Alerted by Sophia's atrocious piano playing, perceptive 
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of her face, and recalling specific events, Tom detects her love 
for him and discovers his passion for her. The development of 
observation, memory, reflection, and intuition in this instance 
wittily betokens an empirical model of mental operations. 
Fielding's narrative stance frequently obliges the reader to 
consider the activity of reading in empirical terms. When, for 
example, he introduces Sophia, he claims to want to help the 
reader form an "exact Idea" of the heroine (IV, ii). But the 
images which for him parallel Sophia's beauty are to the reader 
mere allusions. Besides, each attempt to elucidate resemblance 
shows the impossibility of conveying an exact idea of Sophia. 
Frustrated, the narrator finishes by paralleling his private 
image of his wife to that of Sophia and by pretending that this 
image can give the reader an "adequate Idea" of the heroine. 
The descent from exact to adequate idea is as informative as the 
actual inaccessibility of the "adequate Idea". For the reader 
realizes that simple ideas cannot be shared and that the repre-
sentational force of images is arbitrary and conventional. In 
this way, the reader is taught to see that fictional ideas can 
never be exact and that they are adequate only in contradistinc-
tion to ideas of sensation. Fielding invites a similar response 
when he plays with the solipsistic notion that we can only know 
our own ideas. About a footman's resounding knock he says: 
To attempt to describe this Noise to those who have heard it would be 
vain, and to aim at giving any Idea of it to those who have never heard 
the like, would still be more vain. (XIII, iv) 
He pretends to be trapped by the empirical tenets that words 
cannot substitute for simple ideas and that experience alone 
validates the use of words. This irmically excessive commit-
ment to theory prompts the reader to understand the extent to 
which fictional ideas resist philosophical ideas and to respond to 
fictional conventions with a practical sense of assumptions. 
Fielding does, however, use empirical ideas to control the 
reader's judgment of the characters. For instance, he justifies 
Tom's reverence for the gipsy king in terms of the association of 
ideas. Although the leader of the gipsies has none of the 
accoutrements of kingship, Tom beholds him with "an Idea of 
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Awe and Respect." To offset the judgment that this idea is 
imaginary, Fielding claims that "such Ideas are incident to 
Power, and almost inseparable from it" (XII, xii). Another ex-
ample of Fielding's use of empirical ideas to create sympathy for 
the hero occurs when the novelist humourously describes Tom's 
need for a shilling to go to the masquerade (XIII, vi). Fielding 
addresses those readers who might regard Tom's petty wants as 
ridiculous and asks them to reflect on their own larger wants in 
order to have "a perfect Idea of what Mr. Jones felt." Fielding 
holds that material need is not affected by the scale of the need. 
Tom's monetary requirements may be comically small but they 
represent a modification of the same idea that is shared by the 
audience. This clear allusion to Lockean simple modes comple-
ments the novelist's preference for dealing in natural motives 
and rejecting supernatural and spiritual ones.11 Indeed, most 
often Fielding makes perceptual experience and empirical mod-
es the measure of his characters' moral ideas. 
Irony and humour are instrumental in Fielding's education of 
the reader's judgment with empirical ideas. His constant anti-
cipation and redirection of audience response, especially at the 
comic expense of the narrator's standing, makes it clear that 
understanding takes place only together with a sense of fallibil-
ity. The reader is seldom allowed a complete or holistic judg-
ment: he has to be satisfied with a series of partial causal 
explanations. Hence, Fielding comically pretends to be ignorant 
of whole causes. For example, he is only tentative about Jenny 
Jones's dismissal from the Partridge household (II, iii): he 
neither explains her conduct nor analyzes her state of mind. He 
merely speculates about the violence she forestalls by running 
away. Nor does he determine whether surprise or fear renders 
Partridge speechless before his wife, although he is certain 
about Partridge's sexual consolation of his wife, even if this 
certainty is couched in mock tentativeness. By exercising the 
reader's appreciation of the variously ironic withholding of 
causal explanation, Fielding encourages the reader to think 
about sufficient and necessary empirical ideas independently of 
narrative stance. 
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Fielding frequently disclaims omniscience in order to make 
the reader properly confident in conjecturing about causes. So 
he mocks himself as well as the reader when he pretends to be 
unable to describe Sophia's love for Tom: "Her Sensations, 
however, the Reader's Heart (if he or she have any) will better 
represent than I can" (IV, v). Similarly, he will not describe 
Sophia's reaction to the garrulous and coarse Mrs. Honour be-
cause the reader "may probably conjecture" about the heroine's 
mind in a sound way (IV, xiv). In cases where he claims to find 
narrative commentary problematic, as in accounting for the 
deteriorating relationship of Mrs. Blifil and Mrs. Wilkins (II, v) 
and Allworthy's complex idea of charity (II, vi), Fielding serves 
ironically as a model for thinking about cause and effect. In his 
indirect way he stimulates common-sense thinking about 
causation; he also provokes an awareness about imputing and 
ascribing motives that respects empirical assumptions. 
While his manipulation of narrative stance implicitly reveals 
his concern to encourage the reader to expatiate sensibly about 
causation, Fielding also explicitly advises the reader to think 
according to a restricted model of causation. For example, after 
surprisingly explaining Betty Seagrim's hatred of her sister, 
Molly, in terms of sexual jealousy, Fielding announces that "we 
did not think it necessary to assign this Cause sooner, as Envy 
itself alone was adequate to all the Effects we have mentioned" 
(V, vi). To dispel easy notions of cause and effect, Fielding 
occasionally demonstrates the undesirability of judging narra-
tive events simply. In the case of Sophia's loving and fearful 
obedience to her bullying father, Fielding argues that "it is no 
unusual Thing to ascribe those Actions entirely to Fear, which 
are in a great Measure produced by Love" (VII, vi). At one time, 
then, Fielding advises the reader to regard causation in a serial 
manner and at another he counsels a balanced, unconventional 
judgment. 
Out of respect for this empirical estimate of causation, Field-
ing denies parallels between literary and actual causes. Thus, 
he undermines the report that Sophia's charming voice caused a 
horse to stop: 
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Perhaps, however, the Fact may be true, and less miraculous than it 
hath been represented; since the natural Cause seems adequate to the 
Effect: For as the Guide at that Moment desisted from constant Applica-
tion of his armed Right Heel. . . it is more than possible, that this 
Omission alone might occasion the Beast to stop, especially as this was 
very frequent with him at other Times. (X, ix) 
Fielding is tentative about the narrative event in order to 
emphasize the relation of knowledge and experience. The amus-
ing indirectness of style which describes natural, mechanical 
operations helps to stress the gap between narration and real-
ity. With similar consequences Fielding declares, in the in-
stance of the Lieutenant's anxiety to capture Northerton rather 
than to aid the injured Tom, that "We mention this Observa-
tion, not with any View of pretending to account for so odd a 
Behaviour, but lest some Critic should hereafter plume himself 
on discovering it" (VIII, xii). By pretending to eschew causal 
analysis, Fielding is enabled to deflate merely literary observa-
tion. He often insists upon the difference between actual and 
literary causation in order to heighten the tension between 
actual and literary judgment. He tenaciously maintains that 
viewpoints afforded by fiction do not obtain in life. For example, 
he constantly justifies Allworthy's actions and judgments, at 
the same time charging his readers to remember their fallibility 
and to look beyond fictional knowledge. But, while Fielding 
renders his narrative stance variously and unsteadily as a 
means of arousing the reader to a sense of judgment that is 
founded on the separateness of fiction and life, he certainly 
trusts in the affective quality of literary devices to absorb the 
reader and to induce him to real knowledge. Despite the playful-
ly experimental, if traditional, styles which introduce Sophia, 
Fielding's goal is to allow the reader a "perfect Intimacy" with 
the heroine. Indeed, Sophia is "really a Copy from Nature": the 
"Idea of Female Perfection" that she represents is to be found in 
"many of our fair Country-women." Fielding uses the literary 
medium to lead the reader gradually to this sort of knowledge. 
As he says, "it is a kind of tacit Affront to our Reader's Under-
standing, and may also rob him of that Pleasure which he will 
receive in forming his own Judgment of her Character" (IV, ii), 
20 ROBERT J A M E S M E R R E T T 
if the reader has always to be guided by explicit advice as how to 
react. 
In Tom Jones Fielding expects to improve the reader's moral 
judgment: he founds this expectation upon provoking the reader 
to understand causation and knowledge in empirical terms. 
Although he neither composes a "System" nor feels "obliged to 
reconcile every Matter to the received Notions concerning 
Truth and Nature" (XII, viii), his playful disposition of narra-
tive elicits an empirical awareness of learning and judgment. 
His humour prevents the novel from fortifying the predisposi-
tions of both wise and silly people: it permits him to avoid 
continually voicing precepts. He is glad not to be "an ordinary 
Parson [who] fills his Sermon by repeating his Text at the End of 
every Paragraph." Nevertheless, he is adamant about "the 
great, useful and uncommon Doctrine" of prudence which he 
embodies in his comic narrative. The entertaining ways in 
which he connects empiricism and judgment show that not only 
was he aware of the dangers of being didactic but also his 
doctrine of prudence depends upon the extent to which empiric-
al ideas should inform literature and life. 
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